Schalke’s fall to the edge of existence
Schalke’s fall to the edge of existence
It’s 5:45pm on matchday in Gelsenkirchen and tram 302 is bouncing.
The 20-minute, five-and-a-half-mile journey to the Veltins Arena is the first sign of the raucous noise that awaits.
Kick-off for Schalke 04’s match against Nuremburg is still just under three hours away.
But homages to Schalke, in the form of stickers, graffiti and murals, are on almost every surface, surrounded by reminders of the region’s industrial heritage.
The stadium stands on a hill on the city outskirts and every entrance is packed with eager fans. An aroma of beer, bratwurst and cigarette smoke hangs in the air.
An hour before the action starts, the Nordkurve housing the Schalke ultras is full and loud.
By kick-off, there are 62,000 packed in and it is hard to hear a single thought.
This is the Schalke ritual, one that has played out in Europe many times.
Over the past 20 seasons, they have played in the Champions League eight times. In 2011 they reached the semi-finals, losing to Manchester United.
In 2019, their most recent campaign among the elite, they reached the last 16, losing to Manchester City.
But this is a different stage, with different stakes.
This is Bundesliga 2 – the German second tier. Schalke are fallen giants, hanging dangerously close to a second relegation in succession and, possibly, oblivion.
Despite recent assurances that their finances are holding up, the viability of the debt-saddled club as a genuine power is in doubt.
How did this colossus – the third biggest club in Germany in terms of members, with the third most league titles of all time – end up on the edge?
And is there any way back?
“Their fans are talking in apocalyptic terms,” says journalist Felix Tamsut, who writes about football fan culture for Der Speigel and others.
“You have crisis clubs in Germany, clubs going bankrupt, but I don’t think I’ve seen a club as big as Schalke talk in a way like their fans do. It’s shocking to see from a German football perspective.
“It is a huge club – about 160,000 members. That’s more than Real Madrid, more than a lot of big clubs in Europe. Schalke is the most extreme case of a club trying to live beyond its means.
“Having lots of fans doesn’t mean you have the money, but they spent like they did, thinking things would work out.”
In 2016 Schalke signed teenage Swiss striker Breel Embolo for a reported 25m euros (£21.4m). The deal was revealed to Schalke’s fans via a video message that suggested the club had seen off competition from Barcelona, Manchester United and Arsenal.
But three years later, after 10 goals in in 48 Bundesliga games, Embolo was sold to Borussia Monchengladbach for half the amount Schalke had paid.
Nabil Bentaleb, signed from Tottenham in 2017 for 19m euros (£16m), departed for free at the end of his contract.
Embolo and Bentaleb are just two examples of poor recruitment in recent years.
And not only have Schalke bought badly, but they have also sold poorly.
Key players such as Leon Goretzka, and academy prospects Sead Kolasinac, Max Meyer and Joel Matip, who should have represented good avenues for profit, left on free transfers.
A stretched balance sheet came under further strain as the Covid-19 pandemic choked off the income from gate receipts and dented the value of the Bundesliga’s television deal., external
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought an abrupt end to the relationship with Gazprom – the energy giant majority owned by the Russian state and the club’s main sponsor.
“Decisions have been made in the past that were totally wrong and have cost a lot of money,” Anja Wortmann, Schalke Supporters Club board member, tells BBC Sport. “The team they put together didn’t fit and didn’t play well. There was a ‘hire and fire’ culture for new coaches.”
Current manager Karel Geraerts, hired in October, is the 11th permanent Schalke boss in 10 years.
The swift series of pay-offs, hefty transfer fees, punishing interest rates on borrowed money and world events have taken their toll.
Schalke’s debts rose to 217m euros in 2021 and, while they have since reduced that figure, they are sorely missing the income associated with the top flight.
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